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STATE COURT AWARDS DAMAGES IN LABOR DISPUTE
AFTER NLRB REFUSED JURISDICTION
Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council,
49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473, cert. granted, 357 U.S. 925 (1958)
Plaintiffs are partners engaged in the retail lumber and building
materials business. Their employees are not union members. Defendant
unions demanded that plaintiffs enter into a union shop agreement, and
upon refusal, began peaceful picketing of plaintiffs' place of business.
The National Labor Relations Board refused to resolve the question of
plaintiffs' employee representation because plaintiffs' annual amount of
interstate commerce business did not meet the minimum standards set
by the Board.1 Suit was simultaneously brought in the superior court
in and for the county of San Diego. The court enjoined the unions
from further picketing and any other acts tending to injure plaintiffs'
business, and awarded $1,000.00 damages. The Supreme Court of
California, in belief that the state courts were free to act in cases of
refused NLRB jurisdiction, affirmed.' The court held the unions' activ-
ities were an unfair labor practice under Section 8 (b) (2) of the National
Labor Relations Act and ". . . not privileged under the California
law." 3 On certiorari the Supreme Court of the United States vacated
the judgment and remanded to the California high court.4
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the principal
case is founded directly upon Guss v. Utah.' The major difference
between the two cases is that the Guss case did not involve a tort action.
In both cases, a state court is refused jurisdiction to grant injunctive
relief in a case "affecting" interstate commerce notwithstanding the fact
that NLRB had refused to assume jurisdiction. The court stated in the
Guss case that by "affecting commerce," Congress meant to reach the
full extent of its power under the commerce clause. 6 A finding of
general intent to pre-empt the field was reinforced by the court's con-
struction of section 10(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
as having an "inescapable implication of exclusiveness." ' The greatest
objection to the Guss decision is the undesirable creation of a "no man's
land," where injunctive relief can be afforded neither in the state nor
in the federal system.' "Since Congress' power in the area of com-
1 For an outline of jurisdictional standards to April 30, 1957, see 39
L.R.R.M. 44.
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8 Ibid. For a discussion of the "No Man's land" problem in the principal
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merce is plenary, its judgment must be respected whatever policy objec-
tions there may be to creation of a no-man's land," stated the Court.9
Thus, the question of injunctive relief is definitely settled in favor of
national uniformity. Further action is, by the Guss decision, left to
Congress.
The unsettled issue squarely presented by the principal case is
whether or not a state court has jurisdiction to award damages arising
from a labor dispute when the NLRB has refused jurisdiction, even
though the business affects interstate commerce. In remanding the case,
the United States Supreme Court did not reach the damages question."0
Acting upon the remand, the Supreme Court of California in a 4-3
decision upheld the award of damages."' The majority of the court
apparently accepted an implied invitation by the United States Supreme
Court to find a tort under California law.12 The dissent, expressed by
Judge Traynor, found in the failure to reach the tort question only a
pursuit of the United States Supreme Court's "usual policy of judicial
economy." 13
In its latest decision, the California court found the objectives of
the union improper and unlawful, since it was in violation of the policy
stated in section 923 of the California Labor Code. The court also
suggested that if the employees had been at all organized in their deal-
ings with their employer, the unions' activities would have been in viola-
tion of the California Jurisdictional Strike Act. The count found no
conflict with federal law and on that basis again took jurisdiction to
decide the case. 4
The Supreme Court of the United States upheld state court juris-
diction to award damages arising from labor disputes affecting interstate
commerce in United Const. Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp. 5 The
crucial difference between Laburnum and the principal case is that the
tortious conduct in Laburnum involved violence. The difficulty is crys-
tallized in the attempt to draw the jurisdictional line. Violence at first
glance seems to make little difference since a tort is compensable in
damages regardless of the type of unlawful conduct involved. Both the
majority and dissent in the principal case recognize the trouble involved
in a conflict of state and federal policy. The dissent, however, stresses
danger and possibility of conflict in diverse tribunals more heavily than
actuality of conflict in each isolated case.'" An artificial jurisdictional
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16Supra note 11, at 618, 320 P.2d at 487. The possibilities are illustrated by
Baumgartner's Elec. Const. Co. v. DeVries, 9. N.W.2d 661 (N.D. 1958). In a
state having a "right to work" law, not only compensatory, but exemplary damages
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line drawn between tort and injunction would do little to further the
purpose of uniformity since different tribunals would still have the
opportunity to interpret both state and federal labor law and policy.
A line drawn at violence, less arbitrary, insures against labor policy con-
flicts by limiting state jurisdiction to cases involving the exercise of police
power and the preservation of public order. If labor policy uniformity
is sufficient reason to support creation of a "no man's land" in the area
of injunctive relief, it would also seem strong enough to prevent the
drawing of an artificial line between tort and injunction. A line drawn
at state preservation of order is a more realistic temporary answer. The
view of the dissent in the principal case is seemingly consistant with the
policy announced by the United States Supreme Court in Guss v. Utah.
The majority decision reluctantly yields on the injunction issue but
maintains a stand on damages which is apparently contrary to the basic
policy reasoning in the Guss case. As stated by NLRB General Counsel
Jerome D. Fenton, "[T]o allow state damage remedies for unfair
labor practices generally may, even though no like remedy can be pro-
vided by the Board, result in the impairment of a uniform federal labor
policy." 1
7
A recent Congressional appropriation has enabled the NLRB to
relax its jurisdictional standards enough to encompass part of the juris-
dictional no-man's land." The response of Congress and the Board to the
Guss decision is encouraging, if only because it lessens the severity of the
"no-man's land" problem. It is even more encouraging, however, for
the strength it gives to the national uniformity policy expressed in the
Guss case. As the Board occupies more of its jurisdictional territory,
the lack of remedy argument becomes less pressing. The United States
Supreme Court should, therefore, find little necessity for the establish-
ment of differing rules for tort damages and injunction.
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were awarded on a set of facts substantially similar to those in the principal case.
17 Address before the Third Annual Southeastern Conference on Current
Trends in Collective Bargaining held at the Univdrsity of Tennessee in Knoxville.
Partially reprinted, 42 Lab. Rel. Rep. 651 (1958).
18 72 STAT. 457 (13 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News 2859, August 20, 1958).
For an outline of the new NLRB standards, effective October 2, 1958, see 42 Lab.
Rel. Rep. 633.
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